The Nuclear Umbrella States
ILPI Publications, In a Nutshell
Provides an introduction to the notion of security alliances in
which nuclear-armed members are seen to extend a nuclear guarantee to
the rest of the alliance.
Nutshell Paper No 5/2012
International Law and Policy Institute
The term is most commonly used with reference to the nuclear umbrella that the US provides for all members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, 1949). While NATO’s nuclear umbrella is primarily based on US nuclear weapons, the UK and French arsenals are also expected to be drawn upon in a situation of need. Unites States’ separate security alliance with Japan (Ampo (aka Anpo), 1960, Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan), and South Korea (1958, reaffirmed after North Korea’s 2006 test of a nuclear device) place these two countries under the US umbrella, too.
Through its membership in ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty, 1951), Australia is also under the US nuclear umbrella. This umbrella no longer covers New Zealand, who has opted to withdraw from the nuclear dimension of ANZUS. In April 2008, during her presidential campaign, Hilary Clinton proposed to extend the US nuclear umbrella to Israel and other American allies in the Middle East. Following her acceptance of the position of Secretary of State in November the same year, the proposition has not been publicly repeated, and the status of a possible US – Middle East nuclear umbrella remains unclear. The Arab spring, Iran’s sustained nuclear ambition, deteriorating US – Saudi relations and a number of other factors may lead to a redefinition of this possible umbrella.
The former Soviet Union’s and the current Russia’s security alliances are also understood as nuclear umbrellas. Unlike the US’, however, Russia’s has never been officially declared, and remain less clearly defined. Furthermore, following the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, half of the former union’s allies and breakaway states have joined NATO. The security treaty between Russia and some neighbouring countries, known as the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), currently includes Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. All of these, however, are also listed by NATO as ‘partner states’. Other nuclear armed stated, like China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea, are not seen to provide nuclear umbrellas to potential allies.
CONTROVERSY AND COMPATIBILITY
The notion of nuclear umbrellas has caused considerable controversy, as the idea of extending nuclear deterrence to other states arguably violates the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Article 1 of this treaty commits the five recognized nuclear-armed states (USA, Russia, UK, France and China) not to transfer nuclear weapons or technology (or direct and in-direct control over such weapons) to non-nuclear weapons armed states, while article 2 commits the non-nuclear weapons armed states to refrain from receiving the same. In the case of NATO, the ultimate control over the nuclear arsenals of US, UK, and France remain with the three respective governments. In practice, however, NATO’s nuclear doctrine is a shared policy and US nuclear weapons have also been stationed on the territory of other non-nuclear NATO members for decades. This is seen by many as a clear violation of the NPT.
In response to this criticism, it has been contended that at the time the NPT was negotiated, NATO’s so-called nuclear sharing agreements, whereby the US deploys some of its nuclear weapons in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Turkey, were unknown to most signatories. Later, as these agreements have become common knowledge, the US has stressed that since its own forces control these weapons, the sharing does not constitute a breach of the NPT. NATO has also argued that even if the nuclear weapons that are placed in Europe may be carried and released by planes belonging to their host countries, this would only happen in a situation of war, in which the NPT would no longer be binding. Both the Non-Aligned Movement and critics inside NATO maintain that nuclear sharing, a key part of NATO’s joint strategy, violates the spirit, if not the text, of the NPT. The final document of the 1985 Third Review Conference of the NPT emphasizes that the treaty is controlling under “any circumstances”, hence also in times of war. Land-based US nuclear weapons have also been deployed in Taiwan, the Philippines and South Korea, but these were removed in 1974, 1976 and 1991 respectively.
The case of New Zealand demonstrates that nuclear umbrellas may pose a problem where they overlap with nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZ). Following the proclamation of the South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (Treaty of Rarotonga, 1985) and the domestic measures that New Zealand introduced to obey to what it considered to be the imperatives of the zone, the US no longer considered New Zealand to be under its nuclear umbrella. This resulted in a severe diplomatic row between the United States and New Zealand. New Zealand has continued to insist that it will obey the obligations of the Rarotonga Treaty, as well as the domestic legislations underpinning it. Conversely, Australia remains under the US nuclear umbrella while also being party to the Rarotonga Treaty. The compatibility of these two regimes under international law has yet to be thoroughly examined and clarified in a satisfactory manner.
As for the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (CANWFZ, 2006), the US, the UK and France have objected to a clause stating that this treaty will not affect the rights and obligations of the signatories to previous international agreements. This becomes a problem in relation to the so-called Tashkent Treaty (1992), to which Russia and all bar one member of the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, but not Turkmenistan) are signatories. The Tashkent Treaty makes clear that an aggression against one signatory would be perceived as an aggression against all. The US, UK and France therefore consider the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and the Tashkent Treaty as incompatible. Pending a clarification of this issue, the three nuclear weapons armed NATO members await ratification of the additional protocols of the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, which is necessary for the zone to take full effect.
Additional reading
Read more about how nuclear umbrellas may be said to undermine the NPT in Nicola Butler, Otfried Nassauer and Daniel Plesch’s 1997 article Extending the Nuclear Umbrella: Undermining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. For a particular discussion of the legality of NATO’s nuclear sharing in relation to the NPT, consult Otfried Nassauer’s 2000 article Nuclear Sharing in NATO: Is it legal?. For more on the status of the full and forthcoming members of NATO, go to NATO’s own website’s list here. Hans M. Kristensen’s article Japan Under the US Nuclear Umbrella provides a detailed account of US – Japan security relations. Likewise, the Nuclear Information Project has an elaboration on the US nuclear umbrella over South Korea, also written by Hans M. Kristensen, here. Further information about nuclear umbrellas can be found here. Information about Ampo, North and South Korea, ANZUS, the Middle East, NPT, CSTO, CANWFZ and the Tashkent Treaty can also be found on Wikipedia.
Nutshell Paper No 5/2012
International Law and Policy Institute
click map to enlarge
BACKGROUND
The term nuclear umbrella refers to the
guarantee of military protection that nuclear weapons armed states are
seen to extend, if need be with nuclear weapons, to their non-nuclear
weapons armed allies. Nuclear umbrellas are usually, but not always,
explicitly declared. Either way, being under a nuclear umbrella
presumably implies that a non-nuclear weapons armed state enhances its
own protection from being an ally of a nuclear weapons armed state.
There are, essentially, two nuclear umbrellas, the US’s and Russia’s.The term is most commonly used with reference to the nuclear umbrella that the US provides for all members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO, 1949). While NATO’s nuclear umbrella is primarily based on US nuclear weapons, the UK and French arsenals are also expected to be drawn upon in a situation of need. Unites States’ separate security alliance with Japan (Ampo (aka Anpo), 1960, Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan), and South Korea (1958, reaffirmed after North Korea’s 2006 test of a nuclear device) place these two countries under the US umbrella, too.
Through its membership in ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty, 1951), Australia is also under the US nuclear umbrella. This umbrella no longer covers New Zealand, who has opted to withdraw from the nuclear dimension of ANZUS. In April 2008, during her presidential campaign, Hilary Clinton proposed to extend the US nuclear umbrella to Israel and other American allies in the Middle East. Following her acceptance of the position of Secretary of State in November the same year, the proposition has not been publicly repeated, and the status of a possible US – Middle East nuclear umbrella remains unclear. The Arab spring, Iran’s sustained nuclear ambition, deteriorating US – Saudi relations and a number of other factors may lead to a redefinition of this possible umbrella.
The former Soviet Union’s and the current Russia’s security alliances are also understood as nuclear umbrellas. Unlike the US’, however, Russia’s has never been officially declared, and remain less clearly defined. Furthermore, following the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact and the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, half of the former union’s allies and breakaway states have joined NATO. The security treaty between Russia and some neighbouring countries, known as the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO), currently includes Belarus, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. All of these, however, are also listed by NATO as ‘partner states’. Other nuclear armed stated, like China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea, are not seen to provide nuclear umbrellas to potential allies.
CONTROVERSY AND COMPATIBILITY
The notion of nuclear umbrellas has caused considerable controversy, as the idea of extending nuclear deterrence to other states arguably violates the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Article 1 of this treaty commits the five recognized nuclear-armed states (USA, Russia, UK, France and China) not to transfer nuclear weapons or technology (or direct and in-direct control over such weapons) to non-nuclear weapons armed states, while article 2 commits the non-nuclear weapons armed states to refrain from receiving the same. In the case of NATO, the ultimate control over the nuclear arsenals of US, UK, and France remain with the three respective governments. In practice, however, NATO’s nuclear doctrine is a shared policy and US nuclear weapons have also been stationed on the territory of other non-nuclear NATO members for decades. This is seen by many as a clear violation of the NPT.
In response to this criticism, it has been contended that at the time the NPT was negotiated, NATO’s so-called nuclear sharing agreements, whereby the US deploys some of its nuclear weapons in Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, and Turkey, were unknown to most signatories. Later, as these agreements have become common knowledge, the US has stressed that since its own forces control these weapons, the sharing does not constitute a breach of the NPT. NATO has also argued that even if the nuclear weapons that are placed in Europe may be carried and released by planes belonging to their host countries, this would only happen in a situation of war, in which the NPT would no longer be binding. Both the Non-Aligned Movement and critics inside NATO maintain that nuclear sharing, a key part of NATO’s joint strategy, violates the spirit, if not the text, of the NPT. The final document of the 1985 Third Review Conference of the NPT emphasizes that the treaty is controlling under “any circumstances”, hence also in times of war. Land-based US nuclear weapons have also been deployed in Taiwan, the Philippines and South Korea, but these were removed in 1974, 1976 and 1991 respectively.
The case of New Zealand demonstrates that nuclear umbrellas may pose a problem where they overlap with nuclear weapons free zones (NWFZ). Following the proclamation of the South Pacific Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (Treaty of Rarotonga, 1985) and the domestic measures that New Zealand introduced to obey to what it considered to be the imperatives of the zone, the US no longer considered New Zealand to be under its nuclear umbrella. This resulted in a severe diplomatic row between the United States and New Zealand. New Zealand has continued to insist that it will obey the obligations of the Rarotonga Treaty, as well as the domestic legislations underpinning it. Conversely, Australia remains under the US nuclear umbrella while also being party to the Rarotonga Treaty. The compatibility of these two regimes under international law has yet to be thoroughly examined and clarified in a satisfactory manner.
As for the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (CANWFZ, 2006), the US, the UK and France have objected to a clause stating that this treaty will not affect the rights and obligations of the signatories to previous international agreements. This becomes a problem in relation to the so-called Tashkent Treaty (1992), to which Russia and all bar one member of the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, but not Turkmenistan) are signatories. The Tashkent Treaty makes clear that an aggression against one signatory would be perceived as an aggression against all. The US, UK and France therefore consider the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone and the Tashkent Treaty as incompatible. Pending a clarification of this issue, the three nuclear weapons armed NATO members await ratification of the additional protocols of the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone, which is necessary for the zone to take full effect.
Additional reading
Read more about how nuclear umbrellas may be said to undermine the NPT in Nicola Butler, Otfried Nassauer and Daniel Plesch’s 1997 article Extending the Nuclear Umbrella: Undermining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. For a particular discussion of the legality of NATO’s nuclear sharing in relation to the NPT, consult Otfried Nassauer’s 2000 article Nuclear Sharing in NATO: Is it legal?. For more on the status of the full and forthcoming members of NATO, go to NATO’s own website’s list here. Hans M. Kristensen’s article Japan Under the US Nuclear Umbrella provides a detailed account of US – Japan security relations. Likewise, the Nuclear Information Project has an elaboration on the US nuclear umbrella over South Korea, also written by Hans M. Kristensen, here. Further information about nuclear umbrellas can be found here. Information about Ampo, North and South Korea, ANZUS, the Middle East, NPT, CSTO, CANWFZ and the Tashkent Treaty can also be found on Wikipedia.
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